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CRIMINAL LAW-STATUTORY DEFINITION OF KNOWLEDGE-State v.
Shipp, 93 Wn. 2d 510, 610 P.2d 1322 (1980).
In State v. Shipp' the Washington Supreme Court interpreted the mean-
ing of "knowledge" as used in Washington's criminal culpability stat-
ute.2 Defendants in three different trials were convicted of crimes requir-
ing proof of knowledge. 3 In each case the trial court gave jury instructions
directing the jury "to find that a person has knowledge if it finds that 'he
has information which would lead a reasonable person in the same situa-
tion to believe that [the relevant] facts exist.' "4 The issue in Shipp was
whether these instructions, which were taken almost verbatim from the
statute, were correct.
By a six to three majority, 5 the court in Shipp ruled that the instructions
were incorrect. 6 The court interpreted the criminal culpability statute as
merely permitting, rather than requiring, a jury to conclude that a defen-
dant has knowledge when it finds that a reasonable person would have
had knowledge in the same situation. 7 The court arrived at its conclusion
through a process of elimination. It proposed three possible ways to inter-
pret the statute and then attempted to show that, of the three, only this
I. 93Wn. 2d510, 610P.2d 1322(1980).
2. WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.08.010 (1981). This statute defines four levels of culpability applica-
ble to the Washington criminal code, WASH. REV. CODE tit. 9A (1981): intent, knowledge, reckless-
ness, and criminal negligence. "Knowledge" is defined as follows:
A person knows or acts knowingly, or with knowledge when:
(i) he is aware of a fact, facts, or circumstances or result described by a statute defining an
offense; or
(ii) he has information which would lead a reasonable man in the same situation to believe that
facts exist which facts are described by a statute defining an offense.
Id. § 9A.08.010(1)(b).
3. The three cases, State v. Shipp, No. 82,357 (King County Super. Ct., Dec. 9, 1977), State v.
Hinz, No. 80,397 (King County Super. Ct., Nov. 29, 1977), and State v. Van Antwerp, No. 81,140
(King County Super. Ct., July 28, 1977), were consolidated for the appeal. The defendant in Van
Annverp was convicted for knowingly riding in a stolen car, see WASH. REv. CODE § 9A.56.070(l)
(1981); in Hinz for knowing assault with attempt to commit rape, see id. § 9A.36.020(l); and in
Shipp for knowingly promoting prostitution in the first and second degrees, see id. §§
9A.88.070-.080. 93 Wn. 2d at 512-13,610 P.2d at 1324.
4. Shipp, 93 Wn. 2d at 512, 610 P.2d at 1324. The instruction came directly from WASHINGTON
PATrERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS-CRIMINAL, 11 WASHINGTON PRACTICE § 10.02 (1977).
5. Justice Brachtenbach wrote for the majority, with Justice Rosellini writing for the dissent.
6. In two of the three consolidated cases, this inaccuracy was judged to be sufficient to mandate a
new trial. 93 Wn. 2d at 517, 610 P.2d at 1326. In the third case, State v. Hinz, No. 80,397 (King
County Super. Ct., Nov. 29, 1977), which involved assault with intent to commit rape, the jury
found that the defendant had acted intentionally. Intent, the most culpable mental state, subsumes the
less culpable mental state of knowledge. WASH. REv. CODE § 9A.08.010(2) (1981). Thus, the er-
roneous instruction on knowledge was deemed harmless error. 93 Wn. 2d at 517-18, 610 P.2d at
1326-27.
7. 93 Wn. 2d at 516,610 P.2d at 1326.
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"permitting rather than requiring" interpretation could escape charges of
unconstitutionality and internal inconsistency. 8
This note argues that, contrary to the view expressed by the Shipp ma-
jority, the statutory definition of criminal knowledge, RCW §
9A.08.010(l)(b), can be interpreted reasonably in only one way: The jury
must find that a defendant had knowledge of the fact in question if it finds
that a reasonable person in the same situation possessing the same infor-
mation would have had such knowledge. In other words, for the purposes
of the Washington criminal code, this note argues that the term "knowl-
edge" has been redefined by the Washington Legislature to embrace not
only actual knowledge, but constructive knowledge as well. This inter-
pretation of the statute can withstand an attack on constitutional grounds.
Further, although it does yield a substantial inconsistency within the stat-
ute, 9 this interpretation is directed by well-established rules of statutory
construction.
The Washington courts are not bound, by the doctrine of stare decisis,
to perpetuate an erroneous interpretation of a statute. 10 Consequently it is
hoped that this note, in illuminating the weaknesses in the Shipp major-
ity's analysis, will convince subsequent tribunals considering the ques-
tion to adhere to the interpretation intended by the legislature. I'
1. BACKGROUND: ACTUAL VERSUS CONSTRUCTIVE
KNOWLEDGE
In the majority of jurisdictions, knowledge is either defined or con-
strued to mean actual knowledge. 12 Several states, however, have chosen
to equate constructive knowledge with actual knowledge. 13
8. Id. at514-17,610P.2dat1325-26.
9. See id. at 515, 610 P.2d at 1325; notes 61-70 and accompanying text infra.
10. Jepson v. Department of Labor & Indus., 89 Wn. 2d 394. 407, 573 P.2d 10, 17 (1977):
Windust v. Department of Labor & Indus., 52 Wn. 2d 33, 38, 323 P.2d 241, 244 (1958).
I1. In State v. Funkhouser, 30 Wn. App. 617, 631-32, 637 P.2d 974, 981-82 (1981), and State
v. Matthews, 28 Wn. App. 198, 203-04, 624 P.2d 720, 724 (1981). the court of appeals followed
the supreme court's analysis in Shipp.
12. See. e.g.. Cochran v. State, 255 Ind. 374, 265 N.E.2d 19 (1970): State v. Sheffey. 234
N.W.2d 92 (Iowa 1975); State v. Beale, 299 A.2d 921 (Me. 1973): Commonwealth v. Boris, 317
Mass. 309, 58 N.E.2d 8 (1944); State v. Grant, 17 N.C. App. 15, 193 S.E.2d 308 (1972): Com-
monwealth v. McFarland, 226 Pa. Super. 138, 308 A.2d 126 (1973).
The Model Penal Code (MPC) states that "[wihen knowledge of the existence of a particular fact is
an element of an offense, such knowledge is established if a person is aware of a high probability of
its existence, unless he actually believes that it does not exist." MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(7) (Pro-
posed Official Draft 1962). Thus, under the MPC one need not have actual knowledge, but must have
actual awareness. Such awareness is not required in RCW § 9A.08.010(1)(b). The MPC's approach
generally is followed in the federal courts. See United States v. Valle-Valdez, 554 F.2d 911 (9th Cir.
Vol. 57:389, 1982
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Whether Washington joined the minority position with its 1975 legisla-
tive change of the definition of criminal "knowledge" was the issue in
Shipp. The prior statutory definition of knowledge stated that "knowl-
edge of any particular fact may be inferred from the knowledge of such
other facts as should put an ordinarily prudent man upon inquiry." t4 This
section was interpreted by the Washington Supreme Court to require ac-
tual knowledge. 15 In 1975, when RCW § 9A.08.010(1)(b) was enacted, 16
the legislature decided 17 to drop the "may be inferred" concept, opting
instead, it seemed, to make proof of constructive knowledge conclusive
on the issue whether the defendant had knowledge. The court in Shipp,
however, paid no heed to this legislative decision. 18
1977); United States v. Jewell, 532 F.2d 697 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 951 (1976); Schaffer
v. United States, 221 F.2d 17 (5th Cir. 1955).
13. E.g., Woods v. State, 15 Ala. App. 251, 73 So. 129, 130 (1916); Ball v. State, 149 Ga.
App. 270, 253 S.E.2d 886, 888 (1979); Bennett v. State, 211 So. 2d 520, 526 (Miss. 1968), appeal
dismissed, 393 U.S. 320 (1969); Scheckells v. Ice Plant Mining Co., 180 S.W. 12, 15 (Mo. Ct. App.
1915); State v. Thompkins, 263 S.C. 472, 211 S.E.2d 549,554 (1975).
14. Act of Mar. 22, 1909, ch. 249, § 51(4), 1909 Wash. Laws 903 (repealed 1975) (emphasis
added). Quoted in full, this section read as follows:
The word "knowingly" imports a knowledge that the facts exist which constitute the act or
omission of a crime, and does not require knowledge of its unlawfulness; knowledge of any
particular fact may be inferred from the knowledge of such other facts as should put an ordinar-
ily prudent man upon inquiry.
15. State v. Tembruell, 50Wn. 2d 456,312 P.2d 809 (1957).
16. Washington Criminal Code, ch. 260, § 9A.08.010(l)(b), 1975 Wash. Laws 826.
17. The Washington criminal code was passed as a whole in 1975. Unfortunately, no useful
legislative history exists on § 9A.08.010(l)(b). However, according to Richard H. Holmquist, the
principal drafter of the Washington criminal code, § 9A.08.010(1)(b) played an important role in the
political maneuvering that led up to the code's enactment. Telephone interview with Richard H.
Holmquist (Dec. 22, 1981) (summary of interview on file with the Washington Law Review). For the
code to have had a reasonable chance of legislative approval, it was generally felt that it should be
endorsed by both prosecution and defense factions. Consequently, at the suggestion of the Washing-
ton State Senate Judiciary Committee, the Washington State Bar Association formed a task force of
knowledgeable representatives (including Mr. Holmquist) from both ends of the criminal-law spec-
trum. The task force's job was to work out compromises and arrive at a consensus version of the
code. As it turned out, one of the major compromises yielded the constructive knowledge section, §
9A.08.010(l)(b)(ii). According to Mr. Holmquist, the task force members representing prosecution
interests were very much opposed to having to prove subjective mental states, i.e., actual knowledge.
Considerable concern arose that these members would reject the entire code unless the constructive
knowledge section were added. Thus, in what was evidently an 1 1th-hour decision, §
9A.08.010(l)(b)(ii) was included in the task force's version of the code. The task force members
were well aware that this addition disrupted the hierarchical scheme set out in § 9A.08.010(2). See
generally notes 61-70 and accompanying text infra (discussing the hierarchical scheme). Neverthe-
less, due to time constraints and fears that further impasses would result from attempts to harmonize
the section, they left it in its internally inconsistent state. Virtually all of the members of the task
force correctly anticipated that, if the code were passed and the inconsistency remained, it would be
resolved through litigation.
18. See 93 Wn. 2d at 516, 610 P.2d at 1326. In effect, the court in Shipp resurrected the "may be
inferred" concept.
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II. THE SHIPP COURT'S REASONING
The Shipp majority felt that RCW § 9A.08.010(l)(b)(ii) might reason-
ably be interpreted as creating a mandatory presumption of knowledge. ' 9
However, since a mandatory presumption would be unconstitutional in
this setting, 20 the court concluded that alternative ways of reading the
statute should be investigated. 2'
Accordingly, the majority next considered the viability of interpreting
the constructive knowledge section as constituting a redefinition of the
word "knowledge."- 2 2 The court readily disposed of this option, how-
ever, finding it to be subject to at least two major shortcomings: First,
such a reading was felt to be highly inconsistent with the hierarchical
theme of RCW § 9A.08.010(2); 23 second, the court determined that a
redefinition of this sort would violate the United States Constitution be-
cause the average citizen would not have adequate notice of the terms of
the law. 24
Because neither of the foregoing interpretations was deemed accept-
able, the majority concluded that "the statute must be interpreted as only
permitting, rather than directing, the jury to find that the defendant had
knowledge if it finds that the ordinary person would have had knowledge
under the circumstances.'"25 In the court's opinion, this was the only in-
terpretation that was immune to claims of unconstitutionality and internal
inconsistency. -2 6
The three dissenting justices found the majority's discussion of the
mandatory-presumption interpretation to be inapposite. 27 They felt that
19. Id. at 514. 610 P.2d at 1325. The court said that an instruction based on this statute might
lead a juror to believe that, if the juror found that the defendant had received information from which
a reasonable person would have derived the requisite knowledge. then the juror must also find. as a
mandatory presumption, that the defendant had knowledge.
20. See id. at 515, 610 P.2d at 1325: notes 31-43 and accompanying text infra. The majority
also said that interpreting the section as creating a mandatory presumption was defective because it
prevented the jurors from considering the defendant's subjective intelligence or mental condition. 93
Wn. 2d at 514, 610 P.2d at 1325. However, as was pointed out by the dissent, this concern is un-
founded, for if a defendant can show that he did not "have" the pertinent information (even though a
reasonable person similarly situated would have "had" it), he will not, under the terms of the statute.
be deemed to have had knowledge. Id. at 521, 610 P.2d at 1328 (Rosellini. J.. dissenting).
21. Id. at 515, 610 P.2d at 1325.
22. Id. In other words, for purposes of the Washington criminal code, "knowledge" would be
interpreted to mean not only actual knowledge. but constructive knowledge as well.
23. Id.: see notes 61-70 and accompanying text infra.
24. 93 Wn. 2d at 515-16, 610 P.2d at 1326; see notes 44-60 and accompanying text infra.
25. 93 Wn. 2d at 516,610 P.2d at 1326.
26. Id. at514-15,610P.2dat 1325.
27. Id. at 520-21, 610 P.2d at 1328. The dissenters felt that the cases cited by the majority in
support of its mandatory presumption argument were inapplicable. Implicit in the dissent's elabora-
tion of this point was the idea there are no presumptions of any sort operating as a result of §
Vol. 57:389, 1982
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only the redefinition interpretation was appropriate. 28 Although they did
not respond to the majority's concern over disruption of the statute's in-
ternal hierarchy, they did dispute, although somewhat summarily, the
seriousness of the notice problem. 29 The gist of the dissenters' viewpoint
was best expressed by their statement:
[I]t is apparent... that the legislature intended that persons who ought to
have known what they were doing should be punished the same as persons
who actually knew. It was for the legislature to decide whether the two
groups are equally culpable, and not ajudgment to be made by this court.30
III. ANALYSIS
A. Mandatory Presumption
As noted above, the majority in Shipp claimed that RCW §
9A.08.010(1)(b) was subject to three different interpretations, the first
being that the statute could be read as creating an unconstitutional manda-
tory presumption. 31 As the dissent implied, 32 however, the statute creates
no presumptions of any kind. Rather, the legislature simply redefined the
word "knowledge" to include not only actual knowledge, but construc-
tive knowledge as well. 33
It is a well-settled constitutional principle that all elements of a crime
must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt.34 Thus, a mandatory pre-
sumption that directs the jury to presume the existence of an ultimate ele-
mental fact on the basis of a proven suggestive fact is unconstitutional. 35
In the three cases considered in Shipp, however, there were no presump-
tions, mandatory or otfierwise.
Although there are numerous definitions of the various types of pre-
sumptions, 36 a common thread runs through all of them. The jury will be
9A.08.010(l)(b)(ii). That section of the statute simply involves a legislative definition of an element
of a crime. See notes 31-43 and accompanying text infra.
28. 93 Wn. 2d at 519-22, 610 P.2d at 1328-29.
29. Id. at 521, 610 P.2d at 1328.
30. Id. at 522, 610 P.2d at 1329.
31. Id. at 514-15, 610 P.2d at 1325.
32. See id. at 520-21, 610 P.2d at 1328 (Rosellini, J., dissenting).
33. See State v. Van Antwerp, 22 Wn. App. 674, 681, 591 P.2d 844, 848 (1979), rev'd sub
nom. State v. Shipp, 93 Wn. 2d 510, 610 P.2d 1322 (1980).
34. See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
35. Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510 (1979). However, a mandatory presumption can with-
stand constitutional attack if the suggestive fact is indicative of the ultimate fact beyond a reasonable
doubt. Ulster County Court v. Allen, 442 U.S. 140 (1979).
36. See, e.g., Allen, Structuring Jury Decisionmaking in Criminal Cases: A Unified Constitu-
tional Approach to Evidentiary Devices, 94 HARV. L. REV. 321, 332 (1980). A typical definition
used by Washington courts is that "[p]resumptions are assumptions of fact that the law requires to be
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required, authorized, or encouraged to find fact X, an element of the of-
fense charged, upon proof of fact Y. Contrary to the Shipp majority's con-
clusion, RCW § 9A.08.010(1)(b) does not present this type of arrange-
ment. The statute does not say that the trier of fact must or may presume
the defendant to have had actual knowledge if it finds that the defendant
had constructive knowledge. Rather it says, in very explicit terms, that
for the purposes of the Washington criminal code "knowledge" is either
actual knowledge or constructive knowledge. It is "knowledge," not ac-
tual knowledge, that must be proven, and under section 9A.08.010(l)(b)
constructive knowledge is "knowledge." Consequently, in each of the
cases consolidated in Shipp all that was required was that the jury find
beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant in question had information
that would have imparted actual knowledge to a similarly situated reason-
able person. This requirement was met in all three cases.
The power of the legislature to sidestep the problems associated with
mandatory presumptions by taking the redefinition route cannot, in this
case, be doubted. 37 The legislature's power to define crimes is "virtually
exclusive [and] nearly unlimited." 38 Moreover, as a general rule the leg-
islature may, in defining a word, give it a broader than normal meaning. 39
The fact that the net effect of such a redefinition is to make simple negli-
made from another fact or group of facts found or otherwise established in an action." Lappin v.
Lucurell, 13 Wn. App. 277, 284, 534 P.2d 1038, 1043 (1975). Mandatory presumptions recently
were defined by the U.S. Supreme Court as being evidentiary devices which tell the trier "that he or
they must find the elemental fact upon proof of the basic fact, at least unless the defendant has come
forward with some evidence to rebut the presumed connection between the two facts." Ulster County
Court v. Allen, 442 U.S. 140, 157 (1979) (emphasis added).
37. See Jeffries & Stephan, Defenses, Presumptions, and Burden of Proof in the Criminal Law.
88 YALE L.J. 1325, 1388 (1979):
In every case in which the constitutional objection to a presumption hinged on its departure from
the reasonable-doubt standard rather than on the substantive inadequacy of the facts proved, the
supposed defect could be cured simply by making the law more onerous. Thus, for example.
forbidding a presumption of fact X from proof of fact Y would induce the government either to
prove X beyond a reasonable doubt or to make Y an independently sufficient basis of liability.
38. Hendrix v. City of Seattle, 76 Wn. 2d 142, 157, 456 P.2d 696. 706 (1969). See Morgan v.
Devine. 237 U.S. 632 (1915); United States v. Wiltberger, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 76 (1820). An exam-
ple of the legislature's power can be found in Washington's drunk driving law. which states that -[a]
person is guilty of driving while under the influence of intoxicating liquor or any drug if he drives a
vehicle within this state while: (1) He has 0.10 percent or more by weight of alcohol in his
blood .... ."WASH. REV. CODE § 46.61.502 (1981) (emphasis added). Certainly it is possible that
some people can drive safely with 0.10 percent alcohol in their blood. See Gardner, Breath Tests For
Alcohol: A Sampling Study of Mechanical Evidence, 31 TEX. L. REV. 289. 292-98 (1953). Yet,
under this statute, such people are guilty of driving while intoxicated regardless of whether the alco-
hol has had a detrimental effect upon their driving.
39. City of Seattle v. Buchanan, 90 Wn. 2d 584, 604, 584 P.2d 918. 928 (1978): IA J. SuTHER-
LAND, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRucTION § 20.08 (4th ed. C. Sands 1972).
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gence punishable as a crime40 is irrelevant, 41 provided that the intent to do
so is clearly expressed. 42 This is true even if the proscribed behavior is
malum in se.43 Consequently, the Washington Legislature did not exceed




In the next phase of its opinion, the court in Shipp expressly recognized
that RCW § 9A.08.010(1)(b) can be read as constituting a redefinition
rather than as creating a mandatory presumption.4 Having acknowledged
the redefinition interpretation, however, the court was quick to discard it.
40. Note that the definition of constructive knowledge found in § 9A.08.010(1)(b) does indeed
yield this result. When a person with actual knowledge of certain facts fails to derive from those facts
the conclusion that a reasonable person would have reached, that person is guilty of negligence.
41. See, e.g., State v. Williams, 4 Wn. App. 908, 913, 484 P.2d 1167, 1171 (1971), cited with
approval in State v. Foster, 91 Wn. 2d 466, 475,589 P.2d 789, 796 (1979). In Williams, the court of
appeals stated:
Under [the Washington manslaughter statutes] the crime is deemed committed even though the
death of the victim is the proximate result of only simple or ordinary negligence ...
If, therefore, the conduct of a defendant, regardless of his ignorance, good intentions
and good faith, fails to measure up to the conduct required of a man of reasonable prudence, he
is guilty of ordinary negligence because of his failure to use "ordinary caution." . . . If such
negligence proximately causes the death of the victim, the defendant, as pointed out above, is
guilty of statutory manslaughter.
4 Wn. App. at 913,484 P.2d at 1171.
42. Where the statute is silent on mens rea and the crime in question involves moral turpitude
(i.e., the crime is malum in se), courts generally hold that intent or knowledge is an essential element
of the crime. See, e.g., State v. Turner, 78 Wn. 2d 276, 280, 474 P.2d 91, 94 (1970). But see State
v. Winger, 41 Wn. 2d 229, 233, 248 P.2d 555, 557 (1952). However, where the legislature clearly
indicates that intent or actual knowledge need not be proven, the courts are powerless to hold other-
wise. See, e.g., State v. Stroh, 91 Wn. 2d 580, 584, 588 P.2d 1182, 1184 (1979) ("whether intent is
an element of a statutory crime depends upon the intent of the legislature"); State v. Williams, 4 Wn.
App. 908, 484 P.2d 1167 (1971).
43. There is little dispute that legislation proscribing conduct which is a malum prohibitum will
generally be upheld even though proof of intent or knowledge is not required. See, e.g., State v.
Turner, 78 Wn. 2d 276, 280, 474 P.2d 91, 94 (1970). In contrast, a considerable body of authority
argues that scienter is a necessary element of crimes that are mala in se. E.g., id.; State v. Gregor, 11
Wn. App. 95, 100, 521 P.2d 960, 963 (1974); City of Tacoma v. Lewis, 9 Wn. App. 421,426,513
P.2d 85, 88 (1973). Yet, this latter proposition applies only to statutes that are silent on the issue
whether scienter is required. See note 42 supra. In other words, the legislature may prohibit offenses
that are mala in se without requiring knowledge orintent. In State v. Foster, 91 Wn. 2d 466,475,589
P.2d 789, 796 (1979), the court stated that it found "no persuasive authority for [the] argument that
all statutory offenses other than mala prohibita offenses must, in every instance, contain a legisla-
tively designated element of intent." See also United States v. Greenbaum, 138 F.2d 437, 438 (3d
Cir. 1943).
44. 93 Wn. 2d at 514,610 P.2d at 1325.
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It concluded that, since the redefinition did not appear in "the same sec-
tion or even in the same chapter as any of the sections which specify the
elements of the crimes," 45 a person could be deprived unconstitutionally
of fair warning of the types of conduct that are prohibited. 46 The court
cited no authority on point for this proposition. 47 Countless statutes have
been struck down under the void-for-vagueness doctrine because, due to
ambiguous terminology, they failed to provide the requisite fair warn-
ing. 48 Courts have not, however, declared a statute invalid simply be-
cause in reading it one would have to refer to a general definition section
to ascertain the full meaning of the words contained therein.
In cases involving a separate definition section that clearly pertained to
the operative word or phrase in question, 49 the courts have failed to even
address this aspect of the fair-warning issue. 50 These courts have confined
45. ld. at516,610P.2dat1326.
46. The due process requirement of fair warning is almost always discussed in the context of the
void-for-vagueness doctrine. The classic statement of that doctrine appeared in Connally v. General
Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926):
That the terms of a penal statute creating a new offense must be sufficiently explicit to inform
those who are subject to it what conduct on their part will render them liable to its penalties is a
well-recognized requirement, consonant alike with ordinary notions of fair play and the settled
rules of law: and a statute which either forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague
that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its appli-
cation violates the first essential of due process of law.
See also Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108 (1972): City of Seattle v. Pullman. 82 Wn.
2d 794,797.514 P.2d 1059, 1061-62 (1973); WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.04.020(l)(c) (1981).
47. The court did cite two cases, Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507 (1947), and City of Seattle
v. Pullman. 82 Wn. 2d 794, 514 P.2d 1059 (1973), but both these cases involved statutes containing
ambiguous, indefinite language. The statutes were declared invalid on the basis of these uncertain-
ties, not because of a need to refer to a separate definition section in order to resolve them.
48. See Collings. Unconstitutional Uncertainity-An Appraisal, 40 CORNELL L.Q. 195 (1955):
Note, Due Process Requirements of Definiteness in Statutes, 62 HARV. L. REV. 77 (1948): Note. The
Void-for-Vagueness Doctrine in the Supreme Court. 109 U. PA. L. REV. 67 (1960) (definitive article
by Anthony Amsterdam).
49. It is undisputed that Washington's criminal culpability statute, WASH. REV. CODE §
9A.08.010 (1981). entitled "General requirements of culpability," pertains to the numerous, more
specific statutes that follow in the Washington criminal code, WASH. REV. CODE tit. 9A (1981). See
id. § 9A.04.090. See generally IA J. SUTHERLAND, supra note 39, § 27.02.
50. E.g.. City of Seattle v. Koh, 26 Wn. App. 708, 614 P.2d 665 (1980). In Koh. the defendant
was convicted, under § 301(a) of the Seattle Building Code, of "changing the occupancy" of his
apartment building without first securing a permit from the Building Department. The court stated:
Standing alone, [the term "changing the occupancy" I may not be readily understandable. How-
ever, the term "occupancy" is defined in section 416 of the Code as "the purpose for which a
building, or part thereof, is used or intended to be used." When the legislative body provides a
definition for a statutory term it is that definition to which a person must conform his conduct.
• . . Thus, to "change the occupancy" is to bring about a change in the permitted use of a
building.
Id. at 710-1I. 614 P.2d at 668 (emphasis added). Nowhere in the opinion did the court take issue
with the fact that the definition was in a statute entirely separate from the one stating the crime under
consideration. See also United States v. Clark, 412 F.2d 885, 890 (5th Cir. 1969) (the separate defi-
nitions statute aided, rather than hindered, the defendant); City of Seattle v. Shepherd. 93 Wn. 2d
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their inquiry to the sufficiency of the language used in the definition, not
even considering the hardship occasioned by the need to look outside the
immediate statute to become aware of that language.
This approach to the question of fair warning is not unusual. It is well
settled that, in testing a statute against a void-for-vagueness challenge,
courts will read the statute in light of the common law, 51 prior judicial
construction, 52 and legislative purpose. 53 If defendants can be charged
with knowledge of such amorphous and relatively inaccessible bodies of
information as these, then surely they can be charged with knowledge of a
definition that is contained within the introductory chapters of the very
title in which the criminal statute in question appears.
Perhaps the most severe shortcoming of the Shipp court's opinion on
fair warning is that a uniform application of the opinion's underlying
premise would, in a great number of cases, present the prosecution with
an almost insurmountable hurdle. In effect, the majority in Shipp has said
that a defendant cannot be convicted of a statutory crime unless it is deter-
mined that an ordinary person could, in reading only the statute and the
chapter within which it is found, discern what conduct is and is not pros-
cribed.54 Although it would be highly desirable to be able to guarantee
such a safeguard, it is wholly unrealistic and impractical to do so. Not
only would each word that had been given a broader or narrower than
normal meaning have to be defined in every chapter in which the word is
used, but all of the relevant legislative history, common law, and judicial
constructions would have to be incorporated into the chapter or statute as
well .55
861, 866, 613 P.2d 1158, 1161-62 (1980) (defendant held to a definition found in a separate section
of the very lengthy statute describing the offense); Garrison v. State Nursing Bd., 87 Wn. 2d 195,
197, 550 P.2d 7, 9 (1976) (definition found in wholly separate act was binding, since the pertinent
section of both acts dealt with the same subject matter, and since there Was nothing "in the context or
the nature of things to indicate that [the legislature] intended a different meaning").
51. Note, 109U. PA.L. REv.,supranote48, at84n.83.
52. Collings, supra note 48, at 223-27; Note, 62 HARV. L. REV., supra note 48, at 81-83. In
Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507 (1948), the Court stated that a defendant, "at the time he acted,
was chargeable with knowledge of the scope of subsequent interpretation." Id. at 514-15 (emphasis
added). Furthermore, the Court has even allowed criminal statutes the "benefit of whatever clarifying
gloss state courts may have added in the course of litigation of the very case at bar." Note, 109 U.
PA. L. REV., supra note 48, at 73.
53. Jacobsen v. Board of Chiropractic Examiners, 169 Cal. App. 2d 389, 337 P.2d 233, 236
(1959); City of New Orleans v. Kiefer, 246 La. 305,164 So. 2d 336, 338 (1964).
54. The exact language used by the court was:
[The redefinition of knowledge] does not appear in the same section or even in the same chapter
as any of the sections which specify the elements of the crimes. The ordinary person reading one
of the criminal statutes would surely be misled if the statute defining knowledge were interpreted
to effect such a drastic change in meaning.
93 Wn. 2d at 516, 610 P.2d at 1326.
55. See notes 51.-53 and accompanying text supra.
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If indeed this is the requirement, it is likely that the courts of this state
will soon encounter a significant increase in the number of criminal de-
fendants moving to dismiss their prosecutions on the basis that the statute
is void for vagueness. 56 For example, defendants charged in Washington
with first degree arson 57 or second degree burglary58 would often be in-
clined to make such a motion because both statutes use the word "build-
ing"; yet only the criminal code's general definition section reveals that
"building" means such things as "fenced area, vehicle, railway car [and]
cargo container." 59 When one considers the number of arguably peculiar
definitions found in the general definition section together with the many
unforeseeable twists that courts have read into various criminal statutes,
one becomes aware of the troubling implications of the Shipp majority's
fair-warning analysis.60
2. Hierarchical Inconsistency
In addition to finding that the redefinition interpretation was unconsti-
tutionally vague, the court found, quite accurately, that it was inconsis-
tent with the hierarchical scheme set out in RCW § 9A.08.010(2). 61 This
section demonstrates that knowledge is intended to be the second most
culpable mental state, preceded by intent and followed by recklessness
and criminal negligence. 62 Because constructive knowledge is the equiva-
lent of the objective standard of negligence, 63 it is clear that the drafters'
56. Note that in the recent case of State v. Zuanich, 92 Wn. 2d 61, 593 P.2d 1314 (1979). the
Washington court seems to have indicated that defendants will be allowed to challenge a statute under
the void-for-vagueness doctrine without first having to show that they were personally misled, pro-
vided that they allege that the statute could not be constitutionally applied to any set of facts. See
generally Note, Void-for-Vagueness-Judicial Response to Allegedly Vague Statutes, 56 WAsH. L.
REV. 131 (1980).
57. WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.48.020 (1981).
58. Id. § 9A.52.030.
59. Id. § 9A.04.110(5). The full definition is as follows:
"Building," in addition to its ordinary meaning, includes any dwelling, fenced area, vehicle.
railway car, cargo container, or any other structure used for lodging of persons or for carrying on
business therein, or for the use, sale or deposit of goods: each unit of a building consisting of
two or more units separately secured or occupied is a separate building.
60. A defendant could raise a void-for-vagueness challenge on the basis of statutes contained in
several of the other introductory chapters as well. See, e.g., id. ch. 9A. 16 (defenses): id. ch. 9A.28
(anticipatory offenses).
61. 93 Wn. 2d at 515,610 P.2d at 1325.
62. WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.08.010(2) (1981) states that:
When a statute provides that criminal negligence suffices to establish an element of an offense.
such element also is established if a person acts intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly. When
recklessness suffices to establish an element, such element also is established if a person acts
intentionally or knowingly. When acting knowingly suffices to establish an element, such ele-
ment also is established if a person acts intentionally.




intention was not realized. Yet, contrary to the court's implicit conclu-
sion, 64 this resulting inconsistency does not mandate invalidating the re-
definition interpretation.
A court's ultimate objective in interpreting a statute is to ascertain and
give effect to the legislative intent.65 When confronted with conflicting
provisions, courts resort to the established rules of construction in order
to better realize this objective. In this case, the applicable rule of con-
struction says that, where there is inescapable conflict between general
and specific terms of a statute, the specific will prevail and be given effect
over the general. 66 The Washington counterpart to this rule is usually ex-
pressed somewhat differently: "[W]here provisions conflict, that which is
more clearly expressed should control.' "67 The rationale underlying both
of these versions of the rule has been stated as follows:
[W]hen one section of a statute treats specially and solely of a matter, that
section prevails in reference to that matter over other sections in which only
incidental reference is made thereto ... because the legislative mind having
been, in the one section, directed to this matter must be presumed to have
there expressed its intention thereon rather than in other sections where its
attention was tumed to other things. 68
64. The court said:
Because the [mandatory presumption and redefinition] interpretations of the statutory definition
of knowledge are unconstitutional and inconsistent with the statutory scheme, the statute must
be interpreted as only permitting, rather than directing, the jury to find that the defendant had
knowledge if it finds that the ordinary person would have had knowledge under the circum-
stances.
93 Wn. 2d at 516, 610 P.2d at 1326. It is not clear whether, in the court's mind, the hierarchical
inconsistency would, by itself, have been sufficient reason to strike down the redefinition interpreta-
tion. It is likely, however, that it would have been sufficient, for the court was clearly quite con-
cemed with the incongruous results to which the inconsistency could give rise:
[U]nder this redefinition, it would be possible to convict every negligent driver who causes
injury, in a situation where the ordinary person would have known that injury would result, of
second-degree assault, because RCW 9A.36.020(1)(b) makes it a class B felony, punishable by
10 years' incarceration, to "knowingly inflict grievous bodily harm upon another." This pun-
ishment is equal in severity to the more serious crime of first-degree reckless manslaughter,
RCW 9A.32.060.
Id. at 515, 610 P.2d at 1325.
65. See, e.g., Hart v. Peoples Nat'l Bank, 91 Wn. 2d 197,203, 588 P.2d 204,208 (1978); Gross
v. City of Lynnwood, 90 Wn. 2d 395, 398, 583 P.2d 1197, 1199 (1978); Strenge v. Clarke, 89 Wn.
2d 23, 29,569 P.2d 60, 63 (1977).
66. 2A J. SUTHERLAND, supra note 39, § 46.05; see NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301
U.S. 1, 30 (1936).
67. State v. Douty, 20 Wn. App. 608, 614, 581 P.2d 1074, 1078 (1978), rev'd on other
grounds, 92 Wn. 2d 930, 603 P.2d 373 (1979). See State ex rel. Adjustment Dep't of Olympia Credit
Bureau, Inc. v. Ayer, 9 Wn. 2d 188, 194, 114 P.2d 168, 171 (1941); Williams v. Pierce County, 13
Wn. App. 755, 758, 537 P.2d 856, 858 (1975). This rule, when applicable, supersedes the rule that
says that, when two provisions are in conflict, the latest in order of position will prevail. Schneider v.
Forcier, 67 Wn. 2d 161, 164, 406 P.2d 935, 937 (1965);Ayer, 9 Wn. 2d at 194, 114 P.2d at 171.
68. Long v. Culp, 14 Kan. 412, 415 (1875); see Rath v. Rath Packing Co., 257 Iowa 1277, 136
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Application of the foregoing rule and accompanying rationale to the
conflicting provisions of RCW § 9A.08.010 produces a clear result. The
section defining knowledge 69 is both more specific and more clearly ex-
pressed than is the section setting out the hierarchical arrangement. 70 In
the latter section the drafters were speaking in broad, conclusory terms,
whereas in the former they dealt with a single, isolated subject in highly
definitive language. Consequently, the statutory definition of knowledge
should control.
The result in Shipp, interpreting knowledge to mean only actual knowl-
edge, may not be objectionable. It is objectionable, however, for the
court to reach that result in spite of clearly contrary legislative intent.
7
'
There is nothing inherently wrong with ridding a criminal code of its con-
structive knowledge element; indeed, the vast majority of jurisdictions
have, at least implicitly, opted against equating constructive knowledge
with actual knowledge. 72 However, by doing so in this case the Shipp
court usurped the power of the legislature. It thereby violated one of the
most fundamental tenets of our system of government.
IV. CONCLUSION
RCW § 9A.08.010(l)(b) declares that a person has "knowledge"
when "he has information which would lead a reasonable man in the
same situation to believe that facts exist which facts are described by a
statute defining an offense." The majority in Shipp found that this statute
could be interpreted in three different ways: (1) as creating a mandatory
presumption; (2) as redefining the word "knowledge" to include con-
structive knowledge; or (3) as permitting, but not requiring, the jury to
find that the defendant had knowledge if it finds that a reasonable person
would have had knowledge under the circumstances. The court deter-
mined that the first two interpretations were, as applied to this case, un-
constitutional. Furthermore, it noted that the second interpretation
yielded an inconsistency within the statute's internal hierarchy. Thus. it
concluded that the third interpretation, which is subject to neither of these
shortcomings, is the correct one.
The court's reasoning in Shipp is unsound. It is not justified by the
language of the statute, for that language leads to a contrary result. Nor
N.W.2d 410, 416 (1965): County Bd. of Educ. v. Fiscal Court, 221 Ky. 106. 298 S.W. 185. 186
(1927): see also United States v. Windle, 158 F.2d 196 (8th Cir. 1946).
69. WASH. REv. CODE § 9A.08.010(ll(b) (1981), reprintedin note 2snpra.
70. Id. § 9A.08.010(2). reprinted in note 62 supra.
71. See generally note 17 supra (discussing the legislative intent behind the criminal "knowl-
edge" section).




can it be justified by the court's process of elimination. The first interpre-
tation is inappropriate, for no presumptions of any sort were created. The
third interpretation merely resulted from the court's process of elimina-
tion and has no independent basis for support. The second interpretation,
rejected by the court, should have prevailed. That this second interpreta-
tion creates an inconsistency within the statute's hierarchy is not, in this
case, grounds to strike the statute down. Likewise, that a person would
have to look to a separate definitional section in order to ascertain the
meaning of the word "knowledge" as it is used in the Washington crimi-
nal code is also an insufficient basis on which to invalidate the statute.
The clear legislative mandate in RCW § 9A.08.010(1)(b) is that, for
the purposes of the criminal code, constructive knowledge is equivalent
to actual knowledge. Although the result in Shipp may not be objection-
able, the errors in the court's reasoning and its disregard for this legisla-
tive mandate have troubling implications for future cases.
Robert C. MacAulay
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